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Abstract. Mobile users expose their location to potentially untrusted
entities by using location-based services. Based on the frequency of loca-
tion exposure in these applications, we divide them into two main types:
Continuous and Sporadic. These two location exposure types lead to dif-
ferent threats. For example, in the continuous case, the adversary can
track users over time and space, whereas in the sporadic case, his focus
is more on localizing users at certain points in time. We propose a sys-
tematic way to quantify users’ location privacy by modeling both the
location-based applications and the location-privacy preserving mech-
anisms (LPPMs), and by considering a well-deﬁned adversary model.
This framework enables us to customize the LPPMs to the employed
location-based application, in order to provide higher location privacy
for the users. In this paper, we formalize localization attacks for the
case of sporadic location exposure, using Bayesian inference for Hidden
Markov Processes. We also quantify user location privacy with respect to
the adversaries with two diﬀerent forms of background knowledge: Those
who only know the geographical distribution of users over the considered
regions, and those who also know how users move between the regions
(i.e., their mobility pattern). Using the Location-Privacy Meter tool, we
examine the eﬀectiveness of the following techniques in increasing the
expected error of the adversary in the localization attack: Location ob-
fuscation and fake location injection mechanisms for anonymous traces.
1 Introduction
Mobile devices equipped with various positioning systems have paved the way
for the emergence of numerous interesting location-based services. Unfortunately,
this phenomenon has opened the door to many new threats to users’ privacy, as
untrusted entities (including the service providers themselves) can track users’
locations and activities over time by observing their location-based queries.
Location-based applications, in eﬀect, expose over time some of the locations
of users to curious observers (adversaries) who might collect this information
for various monetary or malicious purposes. In most of such applications, users
share/expose their location in a sporadic manner as opposed to a continuous
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manner. Widely used location-based services (LBSs), such as local search appli-
cations for ﬁnding nearby points-of-interests or nearby friends, are good examples
of this type of applications.
To protect users’ location privacy, location-privacy preserving mechanisms
(LPPMs) can be used as a ﬁlter between the location-based applications and
the potentially adversarial observers. Many interesting LPPMs have been pro-
posed for sporadic applications. Anonymization and obfuscation of users’ loca-
tion events (e.g., LBS queries) are the most popular techniques.
However, so far there is no theoretical framework to both formalize the ef-
fectiveness of various location-privacy preserving mechanisms, and to take into
account the characteristics of the underlying location-based application. To ﬁll
this gap, we leverage on the framework that we have proposed and used in
our previous contributions [17,18,19]. More speciﬁcally, in this paper we make
three major contributions. First, we formalize the location exposure in location-
based services, particularly their location-exposure pattern, and add it to the
framework. Second, we build upon this formalization to quantitatively evalu-
ate the eﬀectiveness of various LPPMs, notably the fake-location injection as
a mechanism to protect location privacy of users. Third, we provide an ana-
lytical model, based on Hidden Markov Processes, for localization attacks. We
extend the Location-Privacy Meter tool [1] to support these new features. We
use the incorrectness of the adversary (i.e., his expected estimation error) [19]
in localizing users over time as the location-privacy metric. We also implement
some example location-based applications in our evaluation tool and assess the
eﬀectiveness of various LPPMs.
It is noteworthy that we do not address the problem of quality-of-service
degradation in location-based services due to the usage of a location-privacy
preserving mechanism. This issue is orthogonal to our objective in this paper,
which is to provide methods to accurately assess the loss of location privacy.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we describe our
framework. In Section 3, we detail the localization attack, based on Bayesian
analysis. In Section 4, we evaluate the approach on a concrete example. We
provide the related work in Section 5, and conclude the paper in Section 6.
2 Framework
2.1 Mobile Users
We consider U = {u1, u2, . . . , uN} a set of N mobile users who move within an
area that is partitioned into M distinct regions (locations) R = {r1, r2, . . . , rM}.
Time is considered to be discrete, and the set of time instants when the location
of users may be observed is T = {1, . . . , T}. The precision at which we want to
represent the user mobility determines the granularity of the space and time. For
example, regions can be of a city/block size, and two successive time instants can
be a day/hour apart, if the mobility is supposed to have a low/high precision.
Quantifying Location Privacy: The Case of Sporadic Location Exposure 59
The spatiotemporal position of users is modeled through events and traces. An
event is deﬁned as a triplet 〈u, r, t〉, where u ∈ U , r ∈ R, t ∈ T . A trace of user
u is a T -size vector of events au = (au(1), au(2), . . . , au(T )). The set of all traces
that may belong to user u is denoted by Au. Notice that, of all the traces in Au,
exactly one is the true trace that user u created in the time period of interest
(t = 1 . . . T ); the true trace, denoted by au, is called the actual trace of user u, and
its events are called the actual events of user u. The set of all possible traces of all
users is denoted by A = Au1×Au2× . . .×AuN ; the member of A that is actually
created by the N users is denoted by a and it is equal to (au1 , au2 , . . . , auN ). The
vector of actual traces a is in fact a sample from the random variable A that is
distributed according to p(·) = Pr{A = ·}. The distribution p reﬂects the joint
mobility pattern of the users. We refer to each marginal distribution pu as the
mobility profile of user u, that is au ∼ pu(·) = Pr{Au = ·}.
In this paper, we assume that the users’ proﬁles are independent of each other,
i.e., p(·) = ∏u pu(·). In other words, the location of a user is independent of oth-
ers, given the user’s proﬁle (i.e., there is a conditional independence between the
users’ locations). As users tend to have diﬀerent mobility patterns at diﬀerent
time periods (e.g., morning vs. afternoon, or weekday vs. weekend), we assume
the users’ proﬁles to be time-period dependent. The set of time instants in T is
partitioned by the time periods. Notice that the independence of user proﬁles
means that we are ignoring social correlations among users, e.g., we ignore in-
formation about friendships among users; this is outside the scope of this paper.
However, because of the time dependence, we do take into account indirect cor-
relation among the users’ locations, for instance traﬃc jams in the morning and
in the evening.
Further, we assume that the mobility of a user is modeled as a Markov chain
on the set of regions. So, for user u, the distribution pu of actual traces can
be computed using the transition matrix of its Markov chain. Each state of the
Markov chain represents a region and a time period. We use pτu(r, s) to indicate
the probability of a transition from region r to s by user u in time period τ .
We also use πτu(r) to indicate the probability that user u is in region r in time
period τ , according to the stationary probability distribution of pτu.
Thus, we illustrate the mobility proﬁle of users using a ﬁrst-order Markov
chain model which is dependent on time (periods). It is worth noting that the
Markov chain model can be turned into a more powerful (yet more complex)
model depending on how the states of the chain are deﬁned. If states represent
complex previous location behaviors (past n location, or locations in past day),
then the model can become arbitrarily accurate.
2.2 Location-Based Applications
We diﬀerentiate among the location-based applications according to the fre-
quency at which the users’ locations are exposed. On one end of the spectrum,
users’ locations are continuously exposed through the application, whereas on
60 R. Shokri et al.
the other end, there are applications using which users expose their location in a
rather sporadic manner. In a nutshell, an application is considered to be sporadic
if the exposed locations from the users are sparsely distributed over time, and
it is considered continuous otherwise.
In this paper, we focus on the sporadic case (for some examples of the continu-
ous case see [9,11] ). Examples for this type of systems are (i) location-based ser-
vices where users make location-stamped queries concerning their nearby points
of interest in order to receive contextual information, and (ii) location-sharing
applications by which users can share their location with their friends, or with
people-centric sensing servers, e.g., when they report about a social event.
Let xu ∈ {0, 1}T be a vector that shows which actual events of user u are
exposed through the application. In eﬀect, xu acts as a bit-mask, for example,
if xu(t) = 1, then au(t) is exposed.
We deﬁne a location-based application as a function that maps actual traces
a ∈ A to a random variable X that takes values in the set X = {0, 1}N×T .
The corresponding probability distribution function Pr {X = x|A = a, p} can
be computed as follows, considering that mobile users usually make use of the
location-based applications independently at each time instant:
Pr{X = x|A = a, p} =
∏
u
∏
t
Pr {Xu(t) = xu(t)|Au(t) = au(t), p} (1)
where p is the set of all users’ actual mobility proﬁles.
2.3 Location-Privacy Preserving Mechanisms
The service provider, or any other entity that can access to the users’ locations
through some location-based applications, is considered as the adversary (or the
observer) in this paper. Such an entity can indeed de-anonymize the users’ traces
and eventually localize users over time by relying on its background knowledge
about users (e.g., their home/work address, their mobility patterns). We denote
the background knowledge of the adversary about users by K.
In order to thwart such threats, the users distort their exposed locations be-
fore an untrusted entity can see them. Location-privacy preserving mechanisms
(LPPMs) are put in place to perform this distortion. LPPMs can be implemented
both in a centralized architecture, by means of a trusted third party, and in a
distributed architecture, i.e., an independent installation on each of the mobile
devices. We abstract away these details and provide a generic model: the LPPMs
act on the set of exposed traces and produce a set of traces that are observed
by the untrusted entities. The LPPM is assumed to modify the set of exposed
events using anonymization and obfuscation techniques. We now describe each
of these in turn.
In the anonymization process, the username part of each trace is replaced
by a user pseudonym in the set U ′ = {1, ..., N}. The anonymization mecha-
nism that we consider is the random permutation. That is, a permutation of the
users is chosen uniformly at random among all N ! permutations and each user’s
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pseudonym is her position in the permutation. More formally, the anonymiza-
tion mechanism selects, independent of everything else, a permutation σ accord-
ing to the probability distribution function Pr {Σ = σ} = 1N ! , and each user’s
pseudonym is σ(u) ∈ U ′.
Notice that the pseudonym of a user remains the same for the whole time
period t = 1, . . . , T . The larger the value of T , the easier it is, in general, for the
adversary to de-anonymize the users. In this paper, we do not study changing
pseudonyms. However, we do study the eﬀect of T on the privacy, and in partic-
ular the anonymity, of users (Section 4). Knowing the relation between T and
user privacy is useful for deciding when to change a pseudonym, for example,
when user privacy drops below a certain threshold.
In the obfuscation process, three event/trace transformations can happen:
– The location part of each exposed event can be replaced by a location
pseudonym in the set R′ = P(R) = {r′1, ..., r′2M }. Each location pseudonym
corresponds to a subset of regions in R. Notice that each region can be ob-
fuscated to a diﬀerent location pseudonym each time it is encountered in a
trace, whereas each user is always anonymized to the same user pseudonym.1
– Fake location-pseudonyms can be injected at times that the user does not
expose anything (it is equivalent to say that the LPPM selects a fake location
and then obfuscates it).
– Some of the exposed events can be removed (become hidden).
The LPPM, as the combination of the two processes, probabilistically maps
exposed traces (a, x) ∈ A×X to obfuscated and anonymized traces. The output is
a random variable O that takes values in the set O, which is the set of all possible
obfuscated and anonymized traces of all users. Such a trace is composed of T
events of the form ou′(t) = 〈u′, r′, t〉, where u′ ∈ U ′, r′ ∈ R′, for t = {1, 2, · · · , T }.
A complete trace is denoted by ou′ .
In this paper, we study the case where each exposed event of a user is obfus-
cated independently of other events which belong to that user or other users.
The mobility proﬁles of all users are used by the LPPM in the process of obfus-
cating users’ locations. This knowledge of the users’ proﬁles enables us to design
strong LPPMs against the adversary who also relies on this type of information.
The probability of a given output o is then computed as follows:
Pr{O = o|X = x,A = a, p} =
=
∑
σ
∏
u′
∏
t
Pr {Ou′(t) = ou′(t)|Σ = σ,X = x,A = a, p}
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Obfuscation mechanism
· Pr {Σ = σ|X = x,A = a, p}
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Anonymization mechanism
(2)
Notice that, in general, employing an LPPM reduces the quality of the in-
formation provided to the location-based service. Consequently, the quality of
1 In this paper, we do not consider the obfuscation of the events’ time-stamps, and
leave it for future work.
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service that the user receives is also reduced. Therefore, there exists a tradeoﬀ
between the eﬀectiveness of the LPPM and the quality of service for the user.
Addressing this tradeoﬀ is beyond the scope of this paper. Our objective is to
evaluate the privacy that a given LPPM provides to the users.
2.4 Attacker
The adversary observes o, and by relying on his background knowledge K, tries
to infer the actual location of users. The adversary is assumed to be aware of
the type and the characteristics of the location-based application, and also the
location-privacy preserving mechanism. In order to infer the location of users,
the adversary has to reverse the two mechanisms. The adversary’s ultimate goal
is then formally deﬁned as calculating the following probability distribution func-
tion:
ho(aˆ) = Pr {A = aˆ|O = o,K} (3)
2.5 Location-Privacy Metric
We quantify the location privacy of users as the error of the adversary in es-
timating the actual location of users. The metric is justiﬁed in [19], and its
superiority to other metrics, such as k-anonymity and entropy, is shown quali-
tatively and quantitatively. According to the expected-estimation-error metric,
the users’ location privacy is computed as follows:
LP =
∑
aˆ∈A
ho(aˆ)Δ(a, aˆ) (4)
where Δ(a, aˆ) is a distortion function that determines the distance between ac-
tual traces a and hypothesized traces aˆ. In this paper, we use the following
distortion function:
Δ(a, aˆ) =
1
N · T
∑
u
∑
t
1au(t) =aˆu(t) (5)
which makes LP the average probability of error of the adversary in estimating
the actual location of users over time. Note that, the location privacy of each
user can be computed separately in the same way.
3 Localization Attack
We deﬁne the goal of the adversary to be the localization of users over time:
That is, for a given user at a given time instant, the adversary computes the
probability distribution over regions where the user might be at that speciﬁc time
instant, considering the observed traces. More formally, the adversary computes
Pr {Au(t) = 〈u, t, r〉|o,K} for user u at time instant t for all regions r ∈ R. We
call this the localization attack.
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As an aside, more general objectives can be imagined for the attacker. The
most general one is to recover all traces of all users, i.e., to compute the proba-
bility Pr {A = ·|O = o,K} as in (3).
Monte Carlo methods can be used to compute any desired probability in our
framework. At its base, a Monte Carlo method uses repeated sampling from an
appropriate distribution to estimate the desired probability. In our case, sam-
pling from the distribution that is appropriate for the most general objective,
Pr {A = ·|O = o,K}, is computationally ineﬃcient for large user populations
and long time intervals. Even for the localization attack, the space from which
the Monte Carlo method needs to sample includes all the N ! permutations of
user-pseudonym assignments. Therefore, we choose a diﬀerent method, which
can be applied more generally.
We split the localization attack into two parts: de-anonymization, and de-
obfuscation. In the ﬁrst step, we ﬁnd the most likely assignments between users
and pseudonyms. Formally, we compute
σ∗ = argmaxσ Pr {Σ = σ|o,K}︸ ︷︷ ︸
de-anonymization
. (6)
Then, given this assignment, we compute the probability distribution of the
given user’s location at the given time instant.
Pr {Au(t) = 〈u, t, r〉|o,K} ≈ Pr {Au(t) = 〈u, t, r〉|Σ = σ∗, o,K}
︸ ︷︷ ︸
de-obfuscation
(7)
We use Bayesian inference in order to perform both the de-anonymization and
the de-obfuscation. Both steps have polynomial-time complexity (in N and T ),
so they are computationally eﬃcient even for large problem sizes.
Notice that this computation is an approximation of the a-posteriori prob-
ability Pr{Au(t) = 〈u, t, r〉|o,K}, which can be written as a weighted sum as
follows (we omit, but still imply the existence of, K):
Pr {Au(t) = 〈u, t, r〉|o} =
∑
σ
Pr {Au(t) = 〈u, t, r〉, σ|o}
=
∑
σ
Pr {Au(t) = 〈u, t, r〉|σ, o}Pr {σ|o} (8)
In eﬀect, our approximation replaces the weighted sum with the probability
Pr {Au(t) = 〈u, t, r〉|σ∗, o}. We call this the zeroth-order approximation.
Our approximation can be made arbitrarily precise, at the cost of extra com-
putations, in the following way. The basic idea is to separate the permutations,
over which the summation is done, into N groups according to the pseudonym
that they assign to user u (group 1 assigns pseudonym u′1 to user u, group 2
assigns pseudonym u′2, etc.). Without loss of generality, we assume that u is u1.
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Pr {Au(t) = 〈u, t, r〉|o} =
∑
σ
Pr{Au(t) = 〈u, t, r〉, σ|o} =
=
∑
u′1∈U ′
∑
σ:σ(u1)=u′1
Pr {Au(t) = 〈u, t, r〉, σ|o}
=
∑
u′1∈U ′
∑
σ:σ(u1)=u′1
Pr
{
Au(t) = 〈u, t, r〉|σ(u1) = u′1, ou′1
}
Pr {σ|o}
=
∑
u′1∈U ′
⎛
⎝Pr
{
Au(t) = 〈u, t, r〉|σ(u1) = u′1, ou′1
} ∑
σ:σ(u1)=u′1
Pr {σ|o}
⎞
⎠ (9)
It is computationally infeasible to compute the second sum explicitly. So,
we can do the first-order approximation: we replace the sum with the maxi-
mum of the quantity Pr {Σ = σ|o} over all indicated permutations σ : σ(u1) =
u′1. That is, for each u′1 ∈ U ′ we compute the maximum Pr {Σ = σ|o}
over all permutations that assign the pseudonym u′1 to user u1. Then,
in the ﬁrst sum, we use this maximum as the weight for the probability
Pr
{
Au(t) = 〈u, t, r〉|σ(u1) = u′1, ou′1
}
. Finding the maximum is a Maximum As-
signment Problem, which is solvable in polynomial time; we need to ﬁnd N such
maxima, one for each value of u′1 ∈ U ′. Therefore, the whole computation is still
polynomial, although longer than our original approximation.
However, the successive approximation need not stop at the ﬁrst order. Instead
of computing the maximum Pr {Σ = σ|o} over all permutations that assign the
pseudonym u′1 to user u1, we can expand the second sum as follows:
∑
σ:σ(u1)=u′1
Pr {Σ = σ|o} =
∑
u′2∈U ′\{u′1}
∑
σ:σ(u1)=u
′
1,
σ(u2)=u
′
2
Pr {Σ = σ|o} (10)
Now, as before, we can approximate the second sum by a maximum over the
indicated permutations, and use the computed maxima (one for each value of u′2)
as weights to compute the weighted sum. Alternatively, we can keep improving
the approximation by considering user u3, and so on. If we do this for all users,
then we will have computed the exact value of Pr {Σ = σ|o}. In this paper, we
stay at the zeroth-order approximation, as it is shown in (6) and (7).
De-anonymization: In order to obtain the σ∗ of (6), we need to maximize the
probability
Pr {Σ = σ|o,K} = Pr{o|Σ = σ,K} · Pr{Σ = σ|K} ≡
1
N !
Pr {o|K}
︸ ︷︷ ︸
constant
,
where Pr {o|Σ = σ,K} =
∏
u′
Pr {ou′ |Σ = σ,K} . (11)
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Thus, σ∗ = argmaxσ Pr {Σ = σ|o,K} = argmaxσ
∏
u′ Pr {ou′ |Σ = σ,K}.
Notice that, given the assignment of a user u to the pseudonym u′, the probabil-
ity Pr {ou′ |Σ = σ,K} is independent of all other user-pseudonym assignments.
So, to ﬁnd the most likely assignment σ∗, we ﬁrst compute Pr {ou′ |σ(u) = u′,K}
for all pairs of u ∈ U and u′ ∈ U ′. Then, we construct a complete weighted
bipartite graph whose disjoint sets of vertices are U and U ′ and the weight on
the edge between given vertices u and u′ is the likelihood Pr {ou′ |σ(u) = u′,K}.
In order to obtain σ∗, we then solve the maximum weight assignment problem
for this graph (see also [21]). In our simulation, we use the Hungarian algorithm
in order to solve this problem, which is a special case of a linear program.
De-obfuscation: Given the most likely user-pseudonym assignment σ∗, we
perform the de-obfuscation (7) as follows:
Pr {Au(t) = 〈u, t, r〉|Σ = σ∗, o,K} =
= Pr {Au(t) = 〈u, t, r〉|ou′ , σ∗(u) = u′,K}
=
Pr {Au(t) = 〈u, t, r〉, ou′ |σ∗(u) = u′,K}∑
s∈R Pr{Au(t) = 〈u, t, s〉, ou′ |σ∗(u) = u′,K}
(12)
The distribution over all regions r is obtained by computing the probability
Pr {Au(t) = 〈u, t, r〉, ou′ |σ∗(u) = u′,K} for all r ∈ R.
Adversary Knowledge: The de-anonymization and the de-obfuscation pro-
cesses have been reduced, as seen in (11) and (12), to the computation of the
probabilities Pr{ou′ |σ(u) = u′,K} and Pr {Au(t) = 〈u, t, r〉, ou′ |σ∗(u) = u′,K}.
These probabilities should be computed appropriately according to the back-
ground knowledge K that we consider for the adversary. In the next subsections,
we compute these probabilities for two adversaries with diﬀerent background
knowledge:
– Adversary (I) whose knowledge of users’ mobility is their geographical dis-
tribution over the regions, i.e., K ≡ πˆ.
– Adversary (II) who is a stronger adversary and knows the users’ probability
of transition between the regions, i.e., K ≡ pˆ.
We construct πˆ and pˆ from the users’ actual traces. The element πˆu(r) of πˆ is
calculated as the fraction of time instants when user u is in region r. The element
pˆu(ri, rj) of pˆ is calculated as the fraction of transitions of user u to rj over all
time instants when u is in region ri.
We perform analytic probability calculations, where we also use the condi-
tional independence of observed events, given the actual events. In eﬀect, we
decompose the desired probability into basic parts that can be computed from
known functions. As these calculations are made by the adversary in performing
the attack, the basic parts need to be computable from functions known to the
adversary.
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3.1 Adversary (I)
De-anonymization
Pr {ou′ |σ(u) = u′, πˆ} =
=
∏
t
⎛
⎝
∑
r∈R
∑
x∈{0,1}
Pr {ou′ (t)|Xu(t) = x,Au(t) = 〈u, t, r〉, σ(u) = u′, πˆ}
︸ ︷︷ ︸
LPPM - Obfuscation mechanism
· Pr{Xu(t) = x|Au(t) = 〈u, t, r〉, πˆ}
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Application
· Pr{Au(t) = 〈u, t, r〉|πˆ} ≡ πˆτu(r), t ∈ τ︸ ︷︷ ︸
Background Knowledge of the Adversary
⎞
⎟
⎠ (13)
De-obfuscation
Pr {Au(t) = 〈u, t, r〉, ou′ (t)|σ∗(u) = u′, πˆ} =
= Pr {ou′ (t)|Au(t) = 〈u, t, r〉, σ∗(u) = u′, πˆ}
· Pr {Au(t) = 〈u, t, r〉|πˆ}
=
⎛
⎝
∑
x∈{0,1}
Pr {ou′(t)|Xu(t) = x,Au(t) = 〈u, t, r〉, σ∗(u) = u′, πˆ}
︸ ︷︷ ︸
LPPM - Obfuscation mechanism
· Pr {Xu(t) = x|Au(t) = 〈u, t, r〉, πˆ}
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Application
⎞
⎟
⎠
· Pr {Au(t) = 〈u, t, r〉|πˆ} ≡ πˆτu(r), t ∈ τ︸ ︷︷ ︸
Background Knowledge of the Adversary
(14)
3.2 Adversary (II)
In this case, the calculations can be simpliﬁed if we use two helper functions
α and β, as deﬁned below. In eﬀect, the problem that the attacker faces is
equivalent to estimating the hidden state of a Hidden Markov Process. In the
context of Hidden Markov Processes, the functions α and β are the forward-
backward variables [16].
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αu,u
′
t (r) ≡ Pr {Au(t) = 〈u, t, r〉, ou′ (1), · · · , ou′(t)|σ(u) = u′, pˆ} (15)
βu,u
′
t (r) ≡ Pr {ou′(t + 1), · · · , ou′(T )|Au(t) = 〈u, t, r〉, σ(u) = u′, pˆ} (16)
In Appendix B, we show how to calculate these two functions in our case.
Having calculated them for all t ∈ T and r ∈ R, we can use them to compute
the probabilities of interest.
De-anonymization
Pr {ou′ |σ(u) = u′, pˆ} =
∑
r∈R
αu,u
′
T (r) (17)
De-obfuscation
Pr {Au(t) = 〈u, t, r〉, ou′ |σ∗(u) = u′, pˆ} = αu,u
′
t (r) · βu,u
′
t (r) (18)
where we compute α and β given σ∗.
4 Evaluation
In this section, we present the eﬀectiveness of some location-privacy preserving
mechanisms in protecting users’ location privacy while they expose their location
through some location-based applications. We evaluate the location privacy of
users with respect to the two adversary types we introduced in the previous
sections. We have extended the Location-Privacy Meter tool [19] by adding the
location-based applications, implementing new LPPMs, and new localization
attacks for sporadic applications, as described in the paper.
4.1 Simulation Setting
The location traces that we use in our simulation belong to N = 20 randomly
chosen mobile users (vehicles) from the epﬂ/mobility dataset at CRAWDAD
[15]. The area within which users move (the San Francisco bay area) is divided
into M = 40 regions forming a 5× 8 grid.
We evaluate various LPPMs that operate on top of two kinds of applications.
The ﬁrst type of application is the once-in-a-while application, which also serves
as a baseline for comparison. In this type of application, events are exposed
independently at random with the same probability θ. That is,
Pr {Xu(t) = 1|Au(t) = 〈u, t, r〉} = Pr {Xu(t) = 1} = θ. (19)
The second type of application is the local search application. In this applica-
tion, users make queries, thus exposing their location, when they ﬁnd themselves
in unfamiliar places (which are the places that the user does not visit often, and
hence needs more information about). We model this application as exposing
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the events of user u at location r independently at random with probability that
is a decreasing function of πu(r). In particular,
Pr {Xu(t) = 1|Au(t) = 〈u, t, r〉, π} = θ(1 − πu(r)). (20)
where θ here determines the upper-bound on the probability of location exposure.
We refer to the application simply by using its parameter θ, and its type
(o: once-in-a-while application, and s: local search). For example a local search
application with exposure rate 0.1 is denoted by APP(0.1, s).
For our considered LPPMs, we have to deﬁne two modes of behavior, accord-
ing to whether the application exposes or hides the location. When the appli-
cation exposes the user’s location, the LPPM obfuscates it by removing some
low-order bits/digits of the location-stamp of the event. We refer to the number
of removed bits as the obfuscation level ρ of the LPPM. When the application
hides the location, the LPPM chooses, with some probability φ, to create a fake
location and then obfuscates it (as it does for the actual locations). We consider
two ways in which the LPPM can create a fake location: The ﬁrst way is to
create a fake location uniformly at random among all locations r ∈ R, and the
second way is to create it according to the aggregate user geographical distribu-
tion π¯ = 1N
∑
u∈U πu (i.e., the average mobility proﬁle). We refer to an LPPM
using its parameters φ and ρ, and its type (u: uniform selection, g: selection
according to the average mobility proﬁle). For example LPPM(0.3, 2, u) injects
a fake location (uniformly selected at random) with probability 0.3 if there is
no location exposure, and obfuscated the (both fake and actual) locations by
dropping their 2 low-order bits.
The metric that we use to evaluate the LPPMs is the expected error, as
described in Section 2.5. We evaluate the eﬀect of the application and LPPM
parameters that we listed above (obfuscation level, probability φ of injecting a
fake location) as well as the eﬀect of the diﬀerent application types and of the
diﬀerent ways of creating fake locations.
We are also interested in the eﬀect of the pseudonym lifetime on the privacy
of users. In our model, we consider that all users keep their pseudonyms from
time 1 to T . By attacking at time T , we can compare the privacy achieved by
users for various values of T .
4.2 Simulation Results
We run the simulator for all combinations of the following parameters:
APP(0.1, {o, s}), LPPM({0, 0.3, 0.6}, {0, 2, 4}, {u, g}), and pseudonym lifetimes
{31, 71, 141, 281}. We then perform the de-anonymization and localization at-
tacks (for both (I) weak, and (II) strong adversaries) that are described in the
previous section. The results are averaged over 20 simulation runs. Hereafter,
we present some of the results that we obtain regarding the anonymity and
location-privacy of users.
In Figure 1, we plot user anonymity as a function of pseudonym lifetime.
The anonymity is quantiﬁed as the percentage of users that are incorrectly de-
anonymized by the attacker. Notice that we do not yet plot the location privacy
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Fig. 1. User anonymity versus pseudonym lifetime in location-based application
APP(0.1, o). The anonymity is quantiﬁed as the percentage of users that are incor-
rectly de-anonymized by the attacker. In the top two sub-ﬁgures, we consider the weak
adversary (I), whereas in the bottom two, we consider the strong one (II). The left
column considers the uniform (u) LPPM type, whereas the right column considers
the LPPM type g. Each line in a sub-ﬁgure corresponds to diﬀerent combinations of
obfuscation levels {0, 2} and fake-location injection rates {0, 0.3, 0.6}.
of users, just their anonymity as deﬁned. Each of the four sub-ﬁgures corresponds
to each of the four combinations of adversary type (I-weak, II-strong) and LPPM
type (u, g). Each line in a sub-ﬁgure corresponds to diﬀerent combinations of
obfuscation level and probability of injecting a fake location.
We observe that the anonymity decreases as the pseudonym lifetime (the size
of the observation period) increases. The same trend is seen in all four sub-
ﬁgures, for all combination parameters. By comparing the results that are ob-
tained from diﬀerent LPPMs, we observe the following interesting phenomenon,
regarding the eﬀect of stronger LPPM parameters, in particular when both the
obfuscation level and the fake injection probability are non-zero: By jointly in-
creasing the protection level of the two mechanisms, not only the absolute value
of anonymity gets higher, but also the robustness to longer pseudonym lifetimes
becomes better. That is, the level of anonymity drops with a slower rate as
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Fig. 2. Users’ location privacy in location-based application APP(0.1, s), using various
LPPMs, with respect to localization attack performed by two adversaries (I-weak: left
column, and II-strong: right column). The x-axis shows the fake-location injection rate
φ. The sub-ﬁgures corresponds to LPPM with obfuscation level 4 (for the top two), and
0 (for the bottom two). Each box-and-whisker diagram (boxplot) shows all location-
privacy values (hence, system-level), where the bottom and top of a box show the 25th
and 75th percentiles, and the central mark shows the median. The ends of the whiskers
represent the most extreme data points not considered as outliers, and the outliers are
plotted individually.
the pseudonym lifetime increases. This shows the relation between the eﬀects
of obfuscation and anonymization techniques. The LPPM designer can choose
appropriately the parameters to achieve a desired level of anonymity; or alter-
natively, the pseudonym should be changed when the desired level of anonymity
is no longer achieved.
In Figure 2, we show the location privacy of users who (i) sporadically expose
their location with exposure rate 0.1 in a local search application, and (ii) use
LPPM that adds fake locations to their observed trace according to the aggregate
user geographical distribution. As it is expected, the users’ location privacy
increases when the level of location-obfuscation or fake-location injection in-
creases. However, the main ﬁnding of our result is that, in sporadic applications,
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the fake-location injection can dominate the obfuscation method, in preserving
users’ location-privacy, when the injection rate is higher. Moreover, adding fake
location has a high impact on misleading the stronger adversary, as it reduces
his success down to that of weaker adversary (compare the location-privacy
improvement obtained by injecting fake-locations with rate 0.3 in the bottom
sub-ﬁgures).
5 Related Work
The work related to our paper is threefold: (i) The papers that evaluate the
risk of exposing locations through location-based services (which are mainly
sporadic), (ii) The papers that aim at protecting users’ location privacy for
sporadic applications, and (iii) The papers that provide a framework for location
privacy and describe possible threats and protections mechanisms as well as the
location-privacy metrics.
The risk of location disclosure in mobile networks is evaluated in multiple pa-
pers. The authors use diﬀerent attacks to de-anonymize the users’ exposed traces
(which are exposed in a sporadic manner). Ma et al. [14] make use of maximum
likelihood estimation to identify the users from which the adversary has obtained
some noisy past traces. Freudiger et al. [5] assume the adversary has access to the
users’ home and work addresses and performs the de-anonymization attack on
the observed traces using some clustering algorithms. Similar de-anonymization
of mobile users through identifying their home and work addresses have been
performed by various researchers. Golle and Partridge [7], Beresford and Sta-
jano [2], Hoh et al. [10], and Krumm [12] use diﬀerent techniques to show that
users can be identiﬁed by inferring where they spend most of their time (notably
their home and workplace). De Mulder et al. [3] also present some statistical in-
ference attacks on users’ traces in GSM cellular networks. The authors show how
easily the adversary can identify users if he has access to their location pattern
(i.e., how they are distributed throughout the cells) in such setting. Compared
to this set of contributions, in this paper we take two more major steps: We
not only formalize the location-based application, but also the protection mech-
anisms that can be used to preserve users’ location-privacy. Moreover, besides
the de-anonymization, we evaluate the success of the adversary in ﬁnding the
location of users over time. We provide a systematic formal framework that can
be used to model the combination of a variety of LBSs and LPPMs.
Protecting location privacy of users in location-based services has received a
tremendous attention from researchers in diﬀerent disciplines such as database,
and ubiquitous computing. A majority of the protection mechanisms revolve
around combination of anonymization and location obfuscation. Duckham and
Kulik [4] propose a formal model for location obfuscation techniques such as
adding inaccuracy, imprecision, and vagueness. Krumm [12] shows that the
eﬀects of spatial cloaking algorithms and adding Gaussian noise, or discretizing
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the location (i.e., reducing granularity) can degrade the identiﬁcation success of
the adversary. Gruteser and Grunwald [8] propose spatial and temporal cloak-
ing methods to increase the adversary’s uncertainty in identifying the users.
The privacy of users is quantiﬁed according to k-anonymity. Gedik et al. [6]
propose an architecture and some algorithms to protect location privacy using
personalized k-anonymity. A majority of the location-obfuscation techniques re-
volve around k-anonymity. The interested reader is referred to [20] for a more
in depth overview of k-anonymity-based obfuscation techniques, and also to [19]
for a quantitative analysis of k-anonymity metric for location privacy. As it is
shown in [19,20] these interesting approaches still lack an appropriate evaluation
mechanism and metric that we provide in this paper. In addition to the obfus-
cation techniques, we also formalize and evaluate fake-location injection (adding
dummy events) as another powerful method.
Krumm [13] provides a literature survey of computational location privacy.
Shokri et al. [17] also provide a uniﬁed framework for location privacy, which
is extended and more formalized in [19]. We have built up our system model
on top of these frameworks by extending them in such a way that location-
based services and new LPPMs can be deﬁned and analyzed with respect to the
localization attack.
6 Conclusion
We propose, to the best of our knowledge, the ﬁrst formal framework for quanti-
fying location privacy in the case where users expose their location sporadically.
We formalize sporadic location-based applications. Using this formalization, we
model various location-privacy preserving mechanisms, such as location obfus-
cation and fake-location injection. Formalizing both location-based applications
and location-privacy preserving mechanisms in the same framework enables us
to design more eﬀective protection mechanisms that are appropriately tailored to
each location-based service. We also establish an analytical framework, based on
Bayesian inference in Hidden Markov Processes, to perform localization attacks
on anonymized traces (for adversaries with diﬀerent background knowledge).
The results obtained from the simulations of the attacks on mobility traces un-
veil the potential of various mechanisms, such as the location obfuscation, the
fake-location injection, and anonymization, in preserving location-privacy of mo-
bile users.
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A Notations
Throughout the paper, we use bold capital letters to denote random variables,
lower case letters to denote realizations of random variables, and script letters
to denote sets within which the random variables take values. For example, a
random variable X takes values x in X .
Table 1. Notations
U set of mobile users
R set of regions that partition the whole area
T time period under consideration
A set of all possible actual traces
X set of all possible exposed-locations bit-masks
O set of all observable traces
U ′ set of user pseudonyms
R′ set of location pseudonyms (it is equivalent to P(R))
N number of users
M number of regions
T number of considered time instants (length of T )
au actual trace of user u
xu exposed trace-bit-mask of user u
ou′ observed trace of a user with pseudonym u
′ ∈ U ′
Δ(., .) distortion (distance) function
pu actual mobility proﬁle of user u
pˆu proﬁle of user u estimated by the adversary
πu geographical distribution of user u’s location
πˆu estimation of πu by the adversary
K background knowledge of the adversary about users
APP (θ, type) LBS application with location exposure rate θ, and types:
o (once-in-a-while), and s (local search).
LPPM(φ, ρ, type) LPPM with fake-location injection rate φ, obfuscation level ρ,
and types: u (uniform selection of fake locations), and g
(selecting the fake location from the aggregated geographical
distribution of users).
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B Computing α and β
The computations of α (15) and β (16) are done recursively as follows.
αu,u
′
1 (r) = Pr {Au(1) = 〈u, 1, r〉, ou′(1)|σ(u) = u′, pˆ} =
=
∑
x∈{0,1}
Pr{ou′(1)|Au(1) = 〈u, 1, r〉,Xu(1) = x, σ(u) = u′, pˆ}
︸ ︷︷ ︸
LPPM - Obfuscation mechanism
· Pr {Xu(1) = x|Au(1) = 〈u, 1, r〉, pˆ}
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Application
· Pr {Au(1) = 〈u, 1, r〉|pˆ} ≡ πˆτu(r), t ∈ τ︸ ︷︷ ︸
Background Knowledge of the Adversary
(21)
αu,u
′
t+1 (r) = Pr {Au(t + 1) = 〈u, t + 1, r〉, ou′(1), · · · , ou′(t + 1)|σ(u) = u′, pˆ} =
=
∑
x∈{0,1}
Pr{ou′(t + 1)|Xu(t + 1) = x,Au(t + 1) = 〈u, t + 1, r〉, σ(u) = u′, pˆ}
︸ ︷︷ ︸
LPPM - Obfuscation mechanism
· Pr {Xu(t + 1) = x|Au(t + 1) = 〈u, t + 1, r〉, pˆ}
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Application
·
∑
s∈R
Pr {Au(t + 1) = 〈u, t + 1, r〉|Au(t) = 〈u, t, s〉, pˆ} ≡ pˆτ1,τ2u (s, r)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Background Knowledge of the Adversary
· Pr {Au(t) = 〈u, t, s〉, ou′(1), · · · , ou′(t)|σ(u) = u′, pˆ}
︸ ︷︷ ︸
≡αu,u′t (s)
(22)
βu,u
′
T (r) = 1, ∀r ∈ R (23)
βu,u
′
t (r) = Pr {ou′(t + 1), · · · , ou′(T )|Au(t) = 〈u, t, r〉, σ(u) = u′, pˆ} =
=
∑
s∈R
Pr {ou′(t + 2), · · · , ou′(T )|Au(t + 1) = 〈u, t + 1, s〉, σ(u) = u′, pˆ}
︸ ︷︷ ︸
≡βu,u′t+1 (s)
·
∑
x∈{0,1}
Pr {ou′(t + 1)|Xu(t + 1)=x,Au(t + 1) = 〈u, t + 1, s〉, σ(u) = u′, pˆ}
︸ ︷︷ ︸
LPPM - Obfuscation mechanism
· Pr {Xu(t + 1) = x|Au(t + 1) = 〈u, t + 1, s〉, pˆ}
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Application
· Pr {Au(t + 1) = 〈u, t + 1, s〉|Au(t) = 〈u, t, r〉, pˆ} ≡ pˆτ1,τ2u (r, s)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Background Knowledge of the Adversary
(24)
where t ∈ τ1 and t + 1 ∈ τ2.
